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CHEVRON PIPE LINE COMP ANY, a
)
Delaware corporation; NORTHWEST
)
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)
Delaware corporation,
)
)
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ARGUMENT
A. MISAPPLICATION OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Plaintiffs', Robby Mowrey and Kim Mowrey ("Mowreys") respectfully submit that
the initial question on appeal is whether the District Court properly applied the summary
judgment standard in this case. The Defendants, Chevron Pipe Line Company and Northwestern
Terminalling Company ("Chevron") have completely ignored this issue.
1. The District Court failed to accept the Mowreys' affidavits as true and
improperly assessed their credibility.
Chevron asserts that the District Court "had knowledge of more than enough facts to
determine they (Mowreys) had a potential cause of action" while their bankruptcy case was
pending, but never modified their petition or schedules. Respondents' Brief, p. 6. It is
well-established that on summary judgment, a trial court is not allowed to weigh the evidence:
The trial court, when confronted by a motion for summary judgment, must determine if
there are factual issues which should be resolved by the trier of facts. On such a motion it
is not the function of the trial court to weigh the evidence or to determine those issues.
Moreover, all doubts must be resolved against the party moving for a summary judgment.

Merrill v. Dufjj; Reed Constr. Co., 82 Idaho 410, 414, 353 P.2d 657, 659 (1960).
[Emphasis addeaj.
There was no motion to strike any part of the affidavits of either Mr. Mowrey or Mrs.
Mowrey, nor did the District Court on its O\Vn strike any part of either affidavit. Had the District
Court properly applied the summary judgment standard, it was compelled to find that the
following facts asserted by the Mowreys in their respective affidavit were true:
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.... we retained the services of Attorney Thomas F. Hale to represent us. We were
unaware at that time that Mr. Hale did not intend to, nor did he, personally meet with us
to obtain information or explain the documents that he prepared and filed on our behalf.
Mr. Hale also did not tell us that he would not appear with us at the time of the meeting
of creditors. We signed and filed that petition and schedules on Mr. Hale's
representation that they were properly prepared and contained all of the information
required by the Bankruptcy Court. At the time we signed and filed that petition and
schedules, I truly believed the information we provided and which was included by Mr.
Hale was true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief I had
no information to suggest otherwise. Our petition and schedules were filed on or about
September 8, 2005. I believe that we reaffirmed on all of our secured debt and at most
we obtained the initial discharge of only $12,000.00 in unsecured credit card debt.

Vol. I, R. p. 99. [Emphasis addeclj. The affidavit of Kim Mowrey is the same. Vol. I, R. p. 96.
At the Creditors Meeting held on October 12, 2005, my wife and I appeared without
counsel and were questioned by the Trustee as to the basis for having filed for
bankruptcy protection, to which I responded disclosing my loss of employment and
reduction in income due to the industrial accident on June 29, 2005. There was no
suggestion by the Trustee that we should contact Mr. Hale and amend our schedules to
identify the workman's compensation claim as an asset, nor did the Trustee suggest
that we might have any potential contingent claim/or third party liability.

Vol. I, R. pp. 99. [Emphasis addeclj. The affidavit of Kim Mowrey is the same. Vol. I, R. p. 96.
We were informed by the Trustee at that meeting that there would be a claim for our tax
year 2005 income tax refund and we did receive a refund of approximately $4,000.00 and
subsequently received a request by letter to turnover those funds to the Trustee, which we
did. I understood and believed at that time that we had fully complied with the
bankruptcy requirements and that our case was closed.

Vol. I, R. pp. 99. [Emphasis addeclj. The affidavit of Kim Mowrey is the same. Vol. I, R. p. 96.
As soon as my wife and I became aware that both the workman's compensation claim and
potential third party claim should have been declared as a "contingent and unliquidated
claim" in our bankruptcy schedules, we immediately retained Attorney Kenneth Lyon to
file a motion with the Bankruptcy Court to reopen our case in order to amend our petition
and schedules.
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Vol. I, R. p. JOO. [Emphasis addeaj. The affidavit of Kim Mowrey is the same. Vol. I, Rp. 97.
The facts as set forth in the affidavit of Robby Mowrey and the affidavit of Kim Mowrey
establish the fact that any omission in their Bankruptcy schedules was a good faith mistake based
on their reliance on the preparation of those schedules by Attorney Tom Hale and that they did
not engage in any scheme to mislead any court. It should be noted that in Riley v. WR. Holdings,

LLC, 143 Idaho 242, 92 P.3d 492 (2004) cited by Chevron, the act of "discretion" exercised by
the District Court was in striking an inconsistent part of the plaintiff's affidavit, not in electing to
disregard the fact asserted or question the credibility of the affiant.
The decision in Watts v. Lynn, 125 Idaho 341, 870 P.2d 1300 (1994) provides proper
guidance on the issue of the admissibility of the facts as set forth in Mr. Mowrey's affidavit. In

Watts, the Idaho Supreme Court held:
At the summary judgment state the trial court must accept the affidavit as true and look
to the affidavit itself to determine if it creates a question of fact sufficient to survive
summary judgment.

Id at pp. 346-47. [Emphasis added.]
The decision in Mains v. Cach, 143 Idaho 221, 141 P.3d 1090 (2006), also adhered to the
well-settled rule that issues of credibility should not be resolved at summary judgment unless
the record is clear that credence cannot be given to the affidavit. Id. at p. 225. [Emphasis

added.]
It is clear that the affidavits of Mr. Mowrey and Mrs. Mowrey met the requirements of

Rule 56( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Keep in mind that the facts as set forth in the
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affidavits of the Mowreys were undisputed and unimpeached.

2. Misapplication of the Summary Judgment Standard.
Summary judgment was granted in this case, because the District Court improperly failed
to accept the facts as set forth in the affidavit of Mr. Mowrey and Mrs. Mowrey as true and
improperly discounted their credibility and only by doing so could the District Court find that
they had intentionally concealed the lawsuit or mislead either court. Moreover, this same issue
was presented to the Bankruptcy Court when the Mowreys filed to reopen and moved to amend
their schedules and sought permission to go forward with their claims in the District Court.
Instead of applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel and denying this motion, the Bankruptcy
Court instead entered the Order to Reopen Case on January 28, 2011, and directed the U.S.
Trustee to appoint a trustee to assess both the workers' compensation claim and the third-party
claim in this case (R. p. 101); and, then entered the Order Authorizing Retention and Continued

Employment ofAttorney Representing Debtors in Pending Civil Actions for Workman's
Compensation Benefits and Personal Injury Damages which expressly authorized Mowreys'
(Debtors') attorney to continue to represent them as special litigation counsel on behalf of the
trustee to render necessary legal services in their pending civil actions for Workman's
Compensation Benefits and Personal Injury Damages; and, directed that any recovery from either
or both civil actions be first applied to payment of the Bankruptcy Estate and Trustee's fees
before the Mowreys (Debtors) or their attorney are paid. Vol. I, R. p. 154. Note that this was
incorrectly referenced in Appellants' Brief as being located at Vol. I, R. p. 139.
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B. MISAPPLICATION OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IN THIS CASE

1. Judicial Estoppel does not apply if a debtor's prior position was based on a
good faith mistake.
Chevron asks this Court to assess the District Court's application of judicial estoppel
citing Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041 (8 1h Cir. 2006). The entire argument
presented by Chevron on the issue of discretion completely ignores what was said in Stallings
that "Judicial estoppel does not apply when a debtor's prior position was taken because of a
good-faith mistake rather than as part of a scheme to mislead the court." Id. at p. 1049.
Chevron's arguments also ignores the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Court of Appeals elaboration on
this equitable doctrine as set forth inAn-Tze v. K&S Diversified Investments, Inc., 308 B.R.
448,459 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2004) as was thoroughly discussed in the Mowreys' opening

Appellants' Brief This Court emphasized that the tactic that is properly blocked by application
of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is the "secret or subjective intent" of the litigant. McKay v.

Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 154, 937 P.2d 1222 (1997), cited by Chevron in Respondents' Brief at pp.
6, 10, 16, 20. McKay dealt with a litigant telling one court she agreed with a settlement in a
negligence action, and then telling a second court she never meant to agree with that settlement
in order to try and pursue the claim. In this case, it is emphasized that Mowreys reassert their
argument that the District Court abused its discretion based on the undisputed fact that there was

no evidence in the record that the Mowreys' conduct was anything other than a good faith
omission or an inadvertent oversight, and not an intentional act or scheme to mislead the
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Bankruptcy Court or the District Court.
2. It was the Bankruptcy Court's integrity that was at state, not the integrity of the

District Court.
The purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process. It was
the Bankruptcy Court's integrity that was at stake, not the integrity of the District Court. It is
important in the application of this doctrine of judicial estoppel to note that since the Bankruptcy
Court granted the MovvTeys the right to amend their petition and schedules, and did not deny
them that right, judicial estoppel does not apply in the Mowreys case against Chevron and
Northwest. Unlike the cases cited by Chevron where the debtor did not seek to amend his
schedules and brought the claim before the Bankruptcy Court for consideration, the Mowreys
amended their schedules and permitted the Bankruptcy Court to decide how to address their
claim and the District Court should have left it to the Bankruptcy Court to determine whether the
doctrine of judicial estoppel should have been applied.
C. THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S GRANTING OF PERMISSION TO AMEND THE MOWREYS'
SCHEDULES AND TO PURSUE THIS ACTION ON BEHALF OF THE TRUSTEE BARRS
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IN THIS CASE.

In all of the cases relied upon by Chevron, it is emphasized that the debtor failed to cure
the deficiency by reopening the bankruptcy to the schedules. The District Court did not have that
factual scenario in this case. Chevron suggests that the Mowreys "did not amend their
bankruptcy schedules." Respondents' Briefp. 13. The only facts asserted for that statement is
that the Mowreys did not amend in 2006 when their bankruptcy case was reopened by the Trustee
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for a different purpose, nor did they amend in 2007 when their complaint against Chevron and
Northwest was filed. What is repeatedly overlooked or ignored by Chevron is that the Mowreys

were not counseled on any connection between their claim and their bankruptcy until that issue
was raised at the time of Chevron's motion for summary judgment. Once the Mowreys were

counseled on that issue, they did file their motion with the Bankruptcy Comito reopen their
bankruptcy and did amend their schedules to list both the workman's compensation claim and
this lawsuit as an asset in their bankruptcy; and, just as important if not more important, the
Bankruptcy Court granted their motion to reopen and amend and then further granted
permission to continue to pursue this case on behalf of the Trustee and their creditors. That
fact scenario does not appear in any of the cases cited by Chevron. It does appear in the cases
cited by the Mowreys and Chevron suggests this Court should ignore that fact scenario. The
decision of the District Court, in effect, purports to override the decision of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court in this case.

D. THE MOWREYS REPRESENT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST PURSUANT TO THE
BANKRUPTCY COURT ORDER.

Contrary to suggestion of Chevron, the issue of whether the Mowreys properly represent
the interests of the real party in interest was supported by "cogent argument and authority" as
referenced in Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146. The authority in this case is,
first, the Order entered in the U.S. Bankruptcy Comi which pre-empted this issue by authorizing
Plaintiffs' (Debtors') counsel to continue to represent the Plaintiffs (Debtors) in both the
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workman's compensation case and this personal injury action as "special litigation counsel on
behalf of the Trustee." Vol. L R. p. 154. The Order recognizes both claims as assets of the
Estate and directs that the Estate and Trustee's fees will be paid before the Plaintiffs (Debtors)
can benefit. The District Court is essentially saying that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court does not
have the power or authority to direct the Plaintiffs (Debtors) to continue to pursue this claim on
behalf of the Trustee and the Estate. Regardless, if it is determined mandatory that the Trustee
intervene personally, then IRCP Rule 17(a) directs this action should not have been dismissed
without first affording the Trustee that opportunity. It is interesting that Chevron cites Conda

Partnership, Inc. v. A1D. Constr. Co., Inc., 115 Idaho 902, 771 P.2d 920 (Ct.App. 1989) as a
basis for the District Court properly granting summary judgment in this case. Conda was a case
in which the district court granted summary judgment based upon the procedural flaw of failing
to timely substitute or to join a proper party plaintiff. The Court of Appeals started its analysis of
this issue noting that the district court had not relied on any statute of limitations that controlled
the substitution of the real party in interest and that if the plaintiff had been allowed to substitute
or join the real party in interest then the basis for summary judgment would have been obviated.

Id at p. 903. The Court of Appeals went on to note that the applicable rule is IRCP 17(a), which
provides in pertinent part: "No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection
for ... joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; .... " The decision to grant motions
under Rule 17(a) rests within the trial court's discretion. In exercising such discretion the trial
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court should follow the liberal construction given Rule 17(a)--encouraging the granting of
motions to amend. The court should also further the policy favoring the just resolution of actions-providing litigants their day in court. Id at p. 904, citing Holmes v. Henderson Oil Co., 102
Idaho 214, 628 P .2d 1048 (1981 ). What constitutes a reasonable time depends upon the facts of
each case. In determining a reasonable time, trial courts should consider the good faith of the
plaintiff and the prejudice, if any, experienced by the defendant. Id. at p. 904. Moreover, Rule
17(a) is designed to prevent forfeiture when determination of the proper party is difficult or when
an understandable mistake has been made in selecting the party plaintiff. A great injustice would
result if the legitimate claims were defeated by the simple error of form when the mistake is so
easily corrected. Id. at p. 904. In this case, the issue of a real party in interest was first raised in
the course of Chevron's motion for summary judgment. When raised, as noted, the Mowreys
sought and obtained the above-referenced Order entered by Judge Pappas in the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court directing the Plaintiffs (Debtors) to go forward with this law suit on behalf of the Trustee
and Estate. If determined that Judge Pappas did not have that authority, or if determined
improper, the error is easily remedied on remand by allowing the Trustee to be substituted as the
proper party in interest. That is what happened in Conda. Id. at p. 905.

Failure to do so

rewards Chevron and Northwest and punishes the Trustee and the Estate, as well as the
subrogation claimants in this case i.e. the State Insurance Fund who is the surety in the
workmen's compensation case and the Idaho Special Indemnity Fund who is a co-defendant in
that case.
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E. ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
If there is a basis for an award of attorneys fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code

§ 12-121 and I.A.R. 40 and 41., it is Chevron and Northwest who have defended frivolously,
umeasonably and without foundation, not the Mowreys. In reality, it must be conceded by both
sides that this case presents a different scenario of facts and different issues than has previously
been presented to this Court.
CONCLUSION
First and foremost, it is again emphasized that before even addressing the issue of judicial
estoppel, the District Court had to first construe the facts by applying the proper standard on a
motion for summary judgment i.e. the Mowreys assert that the District Court should have first
construed the facts in this case most favorably on behalf of the Mowreys (non-moving party) and
should only then have applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel given the facts of this case, which
can clearly be distinguished from the facts in A & J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 116
P.3d 12 (2005) and any of the cases considered by the Idaho Supreme Court in that case. In
doing so, the District Court should have found that the failure to disclose the two potential claims
was a good faith mistake that has now been corrected. In addition, it is emphasized that the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court has already entered its Order authorizing the Mowreys and their attorney to go
forward on behalf of the Bankruptcy Estate and the Trustee. Clearly, this was not an appropriate
case for the dismissal of the Mowreys' claim on the basis of judicial estoppel or on the basis that
they were not the real party in interest. If this case is not reversed and remanded, a great injustice
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will result.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that this Court reverse the decision of the
District Court dismissing the Mowreys claims against Chevron and Northwest both as to the
doctrine of judicial estoppel and on the issue of the real party in interest and remand this case so
that the Mowreys can go forward with their action for damages; and, if necessary, so that the
Trustee can intervene as the real party in interest.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~

'7-day of September, 2012.

M. BRENT MORGAN, CHTD.
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